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CHAPTER 7 
Telecommunications: Collective 
Bargaining in an Era of Industry 
Reconsolidation1 
JEFFREY KEEFE 
Rutgers University 
ROSEMARY BATT 
Cornell University 
Introduction 
In the two decades following the breakup of the Bell System in 
1984,2 the telecommunications services industry has witnessed a pro-
found transformation—an explosion of new services in wireless, data, 
video, and Internet communications; dramatic employment declines in 
some segments and rapid growth in others where digital skills are in high 
demand; and de-unionization, growing wage inequality, and the unravel-
ing of the traditional social contract that exchanged employment security 
for loyalty Between 1984 and 1992, old Bell System companies elimi-
nated between 30 and 60 percent of their core workforce, while hundreds 
of small upstarts promised to provide better and cheaper services in de-
regulated markets. 
Yet oddly, despite deregulation, the legacy of the Bell System contin-
ues to dominate the industry, with the former Bell affiliates employing 
the majority of the core industry's workforce and comprising the major-
ity of the industry's market capitalization. Moreover, from the mid-1990s 
on, corporate mergers and acquisitions have led to the reconsolidation 
of the industry into a handful of dominant integrated carriers providing 
long distance, local, wireless, data, and Internet services. The top five 
integrated carriers in the country are all former Bell System affiliates. 
And despite a drop in unionization from 56 percent of the total work-
force in 1983 to 28 percent in 1998, the industry remains one of the 
most unionized m the country. The Bell System legacy of union-man-
agement cooperation, torn apart in the early years of deregulation and 
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restructuring, reasserted itself in the mid-1990s among some of the ma-
jor corporate players and unions in the industry—the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA),3 with about 300,000 industry members, and 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW),4 with 
about 40,000 industry members. 
In this paper, we examine the reconsolidation of the industry, be-
tween 1995 and 2001, focusing on the merger, acquisition, and business 
strategies of the major corporate players; union responses to those 
strategies; and the resulting evolution of union-management relations 
and collective bargaining outcomes.5 We argue that the nature of the 
industry and technology, coupled with its institutional legacy, provides 
incentives for consolidation and recentralization of the ownership struc-
ture. In this process over the last decade, former Bell affiliates have 
sought union support before regulatory commissions, and the unions 
have leveraged their political power to make important gains in collec-
tive bargaining and in organizing new members. As a result, the out-
comes for union members and prospects for union institutional viability 
are more positive than they otherwise would have been. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the extent of re-
consolidation of the industry through mergers and acquisitions, analyz-
ing why some companies won and some lost in the context of unex-
pected growth and opportunity based on the explosion of wireless and 
Internet communications. Then, we examine the reemergence of labor-
management partnerships, based primarily on corporate need for union 
support for merger activity before regulatory commissions. We discuss 
the successes and failures of those efforts by comparing the rise of SBC 
Communications (the former Southwestern Bell, Pacific Bell, Ameri-
tech, and Southern New England Telephone companies) and Verizon 
(combining the former NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and GTE), as trendset-
ters in union-management relations, and the decline of AT&T, tradi-
tionally the pattern setter for the former Bell affiliates. In the last sec-
tion, we review the outcomes of collective bargaining in the current 
period. Throughout the paper, we draw on our qualitative field research 
over several years, collective bargaining agreements, industry data, and 
our own 1998 nationally representative survey of establishments in the 
industry. 
Industry Restructuring and Reconsolidation 
The telecommunications services industry provides bidirectional or 
multidirectional communications over a network, making it distinct 
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from the unidirectional broadcast industries, such as television and radio 
broadcasts. Telecommunications services (SIC 481 and 484)6 is com-
posed of five submarkets: (1) interexchange toll markets (long distance), 
(2) wireline local exchange access, (3) wireless local exchange access, (4) 
cable television distribution, and (5) customer premise equipment (CPE). 
Cable TV is included in the industry because, unlike broadcast televi-
sion, it is transmitted over wire networks, which may be used for two-
way communications. 
Three Phases of Technology-Driven Restructuring 
This industry's revolution has been driven by advances in technology 
but constrained within a highly regulated structure. Regulatory changes 
have lagged behind technological breakthroughs, but the structure has 
evolved to promote some competition rather than to set prices and con-
trol entry. Historically, the regulated monopoly AT&T (with its twenty-
two local affiliates) dominated the long distance, local, and CPE mar-
kets. Cable television and wireless markets were undeveloped. Industry 
restructuring began in the 1970s and proceeded through three stages. 
The first stage in the 1970s initiated competition in equipment markets; 
the second, in the 1980s and early 1990s, brought competition to long 
distance markets; and the third phase, from the early 1990s on, has 
involved the deregulation of local access markets and the rise of wireless 
and Internet services. Below, we briefly review the first and second 
phases before focusing on the third phase in more detail. 
The first stage involved innovations in local data networks, accompa-
nied by a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy to allow 
competition in the markets for business telecommunications equipment 
and leased line services. Some customers began to purchase their own 
PBX equipment from competitors of AT&T's Western Electric rather 
than lease it from a Bell company Over time, other innovations in com-
puter networking would fundamentally change the nature of all telecom-
munications networks. The most important innovation was the develop-
ment of local area networks (LANs), which were the first data networks 
to rely on routers rather than circuit switches. Because they were located 
on a single business s premise, they did not fall under common carrier 
regulations, but they could interconnect over leased telephone lines with 
mainframes or other LANs. The opening of the network and data equip-
ment markets to competition seriously challenged the role of AT&T's 
Western Electric, as the sole source for telecommunications equipment, 
and Bell Labs, as the source of all technical innovation in the industry. 
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Today, data networks based on the LAN design concept are the standard 
for communications networks and carry approximately 75 percent of all 
telecommunications traffic. The CPE market has become very heteroge-
neous. It includes networked computers in LANs, voice-data integrated 
networks, automated and menu-driven call distributed networks on the 
corporate side, and simple inside wiring of other generic customer 
equipment in the residential market. 
The second stage of industrial restructuring began with the deregu-
lation of long distance markets, which proceeded on an erroneous set of 
technological forecasts. The Justice Department insisted on breaking up 
AT&T in 1984 in order to launch an era of competition—one premised 
on the use of inexpensive and decentralizing technologies based on satel-
lite and microwave transmission networks (Rosenberg 1994). Microwave 
network technology, however, was largely obsolete by the time AT&T 
divestiture occurred; and satellite communications were soon relegated 
to a secondary technology used for paging or communicating with re-
mote areas of the world. In the meantime, a digital revolution was under 
way. Advances in customer premise business equipment induced a digi-
tal revolution in network switching and architecture, and the deploy-
ment of fiber optic trunks dramatically increased digital transmission 
capacity. 
To complete the long distance revolution, regulators needed to con-
front the cross-subsidy problem in the AT&T natural monopoly rate 
structure. The old system was designed to provide universal service 
through cross subsidies: long distance prices were set above their cost in 
order to subsidize local rates, which were set below their cost. With the 
AT&T breakup, the regulators created a new system called access pric-
ing. Access pricing requires long distance companies to compensate 
local access providers for the use of their facilities in the completion of 
long distance calls. Access pricing enables more open access to the long 
distance market without either bankrupting the local companies or 
resulting in unacceptably high local service rate increases. The innova-
tion allowed competitors such as MCI and Sprint to enter the long dis-
tance market in the 1980s, using AT&T's network while they were build-
ing their own network trunks. 
Once opened to competitive entry, the long distance market immedi-
ately segmented into its wholesale and retail sectors. AT&T, MCI, and 
Sprint served both the wholesale and retail markets, while some 500 
resellers entered the retail market. Many resellers owned no network 
facilities but instead repackaged and resold the wholesaler s long distance 
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service. In addition, wholesalers such as WorldCom, Level3, and Qwest 
also began selling network capacity to the retailers, large corporate ser-
vice providers, and even the major network providers. During the late 
1990s, wholesalers rapidly expanded network capacity, as a variety of 
energy firms plowed in fiber cable along their networks. As a result, 
wholesale prices dropped, and many companies experienced financial 
distress or bankruptcy. By 2000, there was a considerable overbuild of 
fiber optic network capacity. This allowed wireless firms to offer long dis-
tance as part of fixed-price minutes packages, as wholesale long distance 
prices plummeted. Verizon, SBC, and BellSouth purchased long distance 
network assets from bankrupt and distressed firms at substantially dis-
counted prices, which greatly facilitated their entry into long distance 
markets. 
The third stage of restructuring, the focus of this paper, has involved 
dramatic growth and transformation of local access markets, accompa-
nied by changes in state and federal legislation. It began with the explo-
sive growth in wireless service, which rose from 4.4 million access lines 
in 1990 to over 110 million access lines by 2001, a 42 percent average 
annual rate of growth (Freedman 1999). In addition, in the once satu-
rated market for wireline access (basic telephony), the Internet stimu-
lated demand for second lines, leading to an unanticipated annual 
growth rate of 6 percent (from 134 million lines in 1990 to 192 lines in 
2000) (FCC 2001). Digitalization of cable TV distribution also acceler-
ated local access competition by making possible bidirectional commu-
nications through cable TV lines. 
On the regulatory side, state Public Service Commissions (PSCs), 
with responsibility for regulating local telephone service, redesigned rate 
structures to provide incentives to reduce costs and make innovations. 
Finally, the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to 
encourage competition in the local loop: the incumbent local exchange 
carriers are allowed to enter long distance service in exchange for open-
ing their local access monopolies to competitors such as AT&T, MCI, 
and Sprint. (Under the original divestiture order, all former Bell affiliates 
were allowed to enter the then-infant cellular industry, but AT&T could 
not enter local access markets and the regional Bells could not enter long 
distance markets). The 1996 Act mandated the unbundling of local ac-
cess networks into elements (such as facilities, switches, routers, transmis-
sion equipment, signaling systems, lines, poles, information sufficient for 
billing, and local loop to the customer premises). The purpose of unbund-
ling was to promote network facilities-based competition: each competitor 
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would build or own some network elements rather than entirely relying 
on leasing or reselling of the existing network (primarily owned by the 
former Bell monopolies). 
Nevertheless, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was accompanied by 
a wave of mergers and acquisitions that reorganized the industry into a 
handful of megacarriers that provide a full range of voice and data ser-
vices, wireless and wireline access, and integrated high-capacity back-
bone networks. For example, Verizon (the dominant carrier in twelve 
northeastern and mid-Atlantic states and Washington, DC) is a compos-
ite of several former regional Bells: New York Telephone merged with 
New England Telephone to form NYNEX, which was acquired by the 
former Bell Atlantic; the merged entity joined with GTE (itself com-
posed of numerous independent telephone companies from across the 
United States) to form Verizon in 2000. In addition, after an unsuccess-
ful bid to acquire AirTouch (the former wireless properties of Pacific 
Telesis and US West), Verizon Communications entered into partnership 
with Vodaphone, the successful bidder for AirTouch, to form Verizon 
Wireless. SBC (formerly Southwestern Bell) is now the dominant carrier 
in thirteen states. It acquired Pacific Telesis (serving California and 
Nevada), Southern New England Telephone (SNET, serving Connecti-
cut), and Ameritech (serving five north-central states). It would become 
the dominant partner with BellSouth (the local provider in nine south-
eastern states) to form Cingular Wireless. US West (covering fourteen 
Rocky Mountain and northwestern states) was acquired by the long dis-
tance upstart Qwest, which is headed by a former AT&T executive. 
Moreover, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, carve-outs, and joint 
ventures accelerated in the wake of the Telecommunications Act not 
only among the former Bell companies but among new entrants as well. 
For example, WorldCom merged with MCI despite a heated debate 
before the FCC that the merger posed a substantial threat to competi-
tion in global Internet markets (Keefe 1998). Qwest bought out US 
West in 2000, and in 2001 Alltel was attempting to acquire Century. 
Thus, despite almost three decades of deregulation—a public policy 
committed to the promotion of competition and the repudiation of the 
theory of natural monopoly—the former Bell affiliates continue to dom-
inate the industry. They comprise more than 80 percent of the industry's 
market capitalization (Table 1). The former Bells still dominate local ac-
cess by providing 88 percent of the retail local wireline service (Table 2). 
Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, they also have become whole-
salers of local service to new entrants in the industry, such as competitive 
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TABLE 1 
Market Capitalization and Average Stock Price of Telecommunications Carriers 
Integrated carriers 
Verizon 
SBC 
AT&T 
BellSouth 
Qwest ($40 billion US West) 
WorldCom 
Alltel 
Sprint 
Broadwing (Cincinnati Bell) 
Independent wireless 
Nextel 
Independent interexchange 
carrier 
Global Crossing 
Level 3 Communications 
Independent LECs 
Century 
Citizens 
CLECs and DLECs 
McLeodUSA 
Allegiance 
Time Warner Local 
Communications 
Metromedia 
RCN 
XO 
Covad 
Adelphia 
Equipment manufacturers 
Cisco 
Qualcomm (royalties for standard) 
Motorola 
Nortel 
Lucent 
JDS 
Ciena 
Juniper 
Total market capitalization 
Total market capitalization 
for former AT&T-Bell 
System companies 
Market 
capitalization, 
7/01 
(billions) 
149.0 
137.0 
84.0 
77.0 
51.0 
43.0 
19.0 
18.0 
5.0 
12.0 
8.0 
2.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
141.0 
48.0 
37.0 
29.0 
23.0 
17.0 
12.0 
10.0 
619.4 
Averag* 
1997 
38 
30 
25 
20 
10 
20 
30 
22 
25 
15 
NA 
30 
18 
10 
3 
NA 
NA 
1 
15 
5 
NA 
NA 
10 
1 
22 
12 
12 
1 
20 
NA 
503.0 (81%) 
e stock 
1999 
60 
60 
64 
50 
48 
55 
70 
45 
38 
20 
50 
90 
40 
8 
10 
10 
30 
50 
25 
10 
25 
20 
30 
5 
22 
20 
55 
20 
10 
10 
price 
2001 
55 
42 
20 
44 
30 
15 
60 
23 
24 
18 
9 
5 
30 
12 
3 
15 
33 
2 
5 
2 
0 
5 
20 
64 
17 
9 
7 
20 
40 
31 
Percentage 
change 
1997 to peak 
110 
140 
160 
130 
800 
250 
200 
190 
60 
700 
400 
250 
80 
80 
800 
1,100 
230 
3,000 
450 
1,000 
225 
250 
1,000 
3,000 
120 
630 
340 
4,000 
550 
1,300 
Percentage 
change 
1997 to 7/01 
75 
60 
-10 
90 
375 
-10 
100 
-15 
-5 
80 
-15 
-90 
15 
15 
0 
60 
10 
0 
-75 
-50 
-99 
-80 
200 
1,000 
-30 
-10 
-70 
100 
70 
100 
Note: Italics indicate former AT&T-Bell System companies. 
TABLE 2 
Telecommunications Industrial Structure and Union Representation Status 
Telecommunications wireline access 
Millions of 
wire loops 
Percentage of 
market share Union status ft O 
F 
W ft H 
2 
2 O 
H 
I 
W 
W 
ft 
§ 
Verizon (former Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and GTE) 
SBC (former Southwest Bell, PacTel, Ameritech, SNET) 
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 
Qwest (formerly US West) 
Sprint Corporation 
Top 4 (former Bell companies) 
Top 5 wireline access providers 
62.3 
58.9 
24.8 
16.9 
7.9 
162.9 
170.8 
34 
32 
13 
9 
4 
88 
92 
Telecommunications wireless access 
Millions of 
subscribers 
Percentage of 
market share 
CWA-IBEW 
CWA-IBEW 
CWA 
CWA 
CWA-IBEW 
Organizing 
status—CWA 
Verizon Wireless (formerly GTE, BA Mobility, Airtouch) 
Cingular (formerly CellularOne, BellSouth Mobility) 
AT&T Wireless 
Sprint PCS 
Top 4 wireless companies 
23.8 
16.5 
9.5 
5.7 
55.5 
31 
22 
12 
7 
73 
Long distance carriers 
Revenue 
(billions $) 
Percentage of 
market share 
Card check 
Card check 
Expedited election 
Antiunion 
Union status 
AT&T Consumer and Business Services 
WorldCom-MCI 
Sprint 
Verizon 
Top 3 long distance carriers 
40.2 
23.4 
9.7 
3.1 
73.3 
41 
24 
10 
3 
74 
CWA 
Antiunion 
Antiunion 
CWA 
TABLE 2—(Continued) 
Telecommunications Industrial Structure and Union Representation Status 
Cable television broadband networks 
AT&T Broadband (formerly TCI and MediaOne) 
AOL Time Warner 
Comcast 
Charter 
Cox 
Adelphia 
Top 6 
Revenue 
(billions $) 
16 
12.7 
7.7 
6.4 
6.2 
5.7 
49 
Percentage of 
market share 
23 
19 
11 
9 
9 
8 
80 
Union status 
Expedited election 
Antiunion 
Antiunion 
Antiunion 
Antiunion 
Antiunion 
Sources: 
Wireline: FCC, Trends in Telephone Service, December 21, 2000. Table 8.3 (as of December 31, 1999): Telephone Loops by Holding 
Company 
Wireless: http://www.wow-com.com/industry/stats/bearstearn/ David Freedman, Bear, Stearns & Co. Telecommunication Untethered, 
Q4 1999 
Long distance: FCC: Statistics of the Long Distance Telecommunications Industry, January 2001. Table 1: Total Toll Service Revenues 
by Carrier 
Cable TV: Respective corporate division websites. 
H 
W 
W 
O 
s 
S 
I — < 
o 
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local exchange carriers (CLECs) and digital local exchange carriers 
(DLECs). The CLECs and DLECs often supply some network ele-
ments but largely rely on the incumbent carrier to provide most of its 
access facilities and resources. Also, led by Verizon Wireless, S B C -
BellSouth s Cingular, and AT&T Wireless, the former Bell affiliates pro-
vide more than two thirds of wireless access in a market with six national 
service providers. The others are Sprint PCS, Deutsche Telecom s Voice-
stream, and Nextel. Finally, the former Bell System companies still pro-
vide the majority of long distance service, as AT&T remains the leader 
in the long distance market, and Verizon has quickly become the fourth 
largest long distance carrier as it gains long distance rights under 
Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act. The only industry segment 
where the former Bell affiliates do not dominate is cable television, but 
AT&T Broadband alone holds almost one quarter of the market share in 
that segment. 
After five years of consolidation following the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act, the former regional Bell companies are the winners under the 
new regulatory regime. They are building national and international 
marketing capabilities and network facilities. In 2001, Verizon was the 
largest integrated carrier, followed by SBC, AT&T, BellSouth, and 
Qwest/US West. The regional Bell companies were well positioned to 
take advantage of the 1996 Act. Unlike the long distance carriers, they 
had a primary relationship with customers by providing local service, as 
well as access to long distance providers. While agreeing to open their 
local markets to competition, they are leveraging their embedded base 
to rapidly expand service offerings in long distance and provide bundled 
packages and billing plans. 
Despite the fact that AT&T continues to be a major player, it has 
had a more difficult adjustment to the new environment, as have the 
other incumbent long distance carriers, such as WorldCom-MCI and 
Sprint. After enjoying an initial boom, which they used to make a variety 
of acquisitions, they have faced increasing competition in their core 
markets. AT&T's constant metamorphoses are indicative of its failed 
corporate strategy. In 1996, it divested itself of Lucent Technologies, its 
then highly profitable manufacturing subsidiary, and NCR, its second 
unsuccessful venture into the computer industry. In 1998, it acquired 
TCI and MediaOne to form the largest cable television company, AT&T 
Broadband, only to subsequently dispose of those assets at substantial 
discount to Comcast in 2002. AT&T also spun off AT&T Wireless in 
2001, a business it acquired from Craig McCaw in 1992. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 273 
Why Reconsolidation? 
The first round of local competition has largely failed as the CLECs 
and DLECs participated in the financial boom that by 2001 had turned 
into a big telecom bust. These small upstarts played an important role in 
the industry by accelerating the deployment of the digital subscriber 
loop (DSL) technology. They also disrupted established practices in 
market segments, forcing the Bells to deploy new technologies before 
they were fully ready or tested. Some of these technologies are unreli-
able and difficult to integrate into the existing network. 
Initially, the success of the DLECs in determining new methods, 
technologies, and approaches to competition was measured by their 
market valuations at acquisition or merger. Nonetheless, the difficulties 
associated with successfully rolling out DSL technology were soon mea-
sured by bankruptcy and liquidation sales. For example, Metromedias 
stock price exploded from one dollar per share to fifty dollars per share, 
only to crash at two dollars per share in 2001. Other firms, including 
RCN, XO, Covad, and Adelphia, lost between 50 and 100 percent of 
share price (see Table 1). 
The bankruptcies of these firms cascaded into the network equip-
ment market. Major equipment makers such as Cisco, Lucent, Alcatel, 
and Nortel had not only sold equipment to these upstarts but they had 
advanced substantial amounts of credit to finance their equipment sales. 
At the time of sale, the DLECs and CLECs boasted substantial market 
capitalization after their initial public offerings exceeded all expectations. 
Their rapid descent into bankruptcy or financial distress has impaired 
the FCC s policy of facilities-based competition and has created long-
term problems for telecommunications equipment manufacturers, who 
must retrench even though the technology continues to advance. As a 
result, the initial phase of competition has actually strengthened the 
monopolistic tendencies within the core of the industry. 
Relatively untouched by the turmoil in the industry were the regional 
Bell operating companies, particularly Verizon, SBC, and BellSouth. One 
explanation for this level of industry concentration is an institutional one: 
the legacy of the Bell System continues to dominate the industry. This 
would suggest that there is a time lag due to institutional inertia and that 
over time the power of institutional forces would erode, for example, as 
new entrants come into the market and de-unionization continues. 
However, this does not fully explain the abundance of mergers and con-
solidations among new entrants such as MCI and WorldCom. 
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Another explanation is that the nature of the product markets and 
technology provide incentives for merger and consolidation. That is, the 
network economics once thought to give rise to a natural monopoly still 
constrain the evolution of competition and technological innovation. 
Firms that operate network production processes are subject to econo-
mies of scale. They invest in costly communications networks, which rep-
resent a substantial sunk fixed cost. Furthermore, all participants in the 
industry face substantial uncertainty as they build, modernize, and main-
tain their networks. The evolution of data networks as they supplant the 
traditional circuit-based telephone network creates technological and 
economic uncertainty. The majority of the industry's revenue is gener-
ated by the circuit switched network; however, more than 75 percent of 
the traffic is carried by data networks that feature considerable excess 
capacity and declining prices as a result of the recent overbuild. 
There is also uncertainty created as local access technologies are dig-
itized and begin competing with each other. At the time of the AT&T 
divestiture in 1984, local access technologies were analog. Wireless 
access was delivered by the newly formed cellular service companies at 
high prices with large clunky mobile sets, and wireline access was sup-
plied by the traditional telephone companies, which were still thought 
of as natural monopolies. Cable TVs coaxial distribution networks were 
only capable at that time of unidirectional broadcasts. Each of these 
technologies is now in the early stages of digitization, which has created 
the condition for competition among local access technologies. For con-
sumers this offers many more options, while for providers it creates 
many more uncertainties. Betting on the wrong technology or media is 
likely to have dire consequences. The economic advantages and disad-
vantages among the competing media are ever changing, which makes 
forecasting a nightmare but unavoidable when investing in long-lived 
network elements. 
In sum, several factors have driven industry reconsolidation. Bringing 
competition into the industry has been complicated by the presence of 
network externalities, scale economies, excess capacity, and technological 
uncertainty. These factors create incentives for companies to merge, 
form partnerships, and diversify across competing technologies. 
Employment and Union Implications of Restructuring 
The extensive change in telecommunications technologies has led to 
a blurring of industry boundaries, making precise determination of 
employment trends difficult to calculate on the basis of existing national 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 275 
data series. The overwhelming bulk of employment in the industry is 
captured under SIC code 481 (telephone communications, including 
wireline and wireless segments). Between 1983 and 1998, employment 
grew from 1.15 million to 1.3 million (Current Population Survey [CPS] 
1999). In addition, cable TV employment has remained relatively stable, 
at about 150,000 employees. Employment in Internet services and cus-
tomer premise equipment is more difficult to track because these seg-
ments cut across various industries; but they are much smaller than 
either the wireless or cable TV segments. Our best estimate, therefore, 
is that employment in the five market segments grew from about 1.3 
million in 1983 to 1.6 million in 1998, a 23 percent overall increase, or 
about 1.5 percent annually. 
We calculated a breakdown of employment by occupational group 
and industry and customer segments, based on our own 1998 survey of a 
nationally representative sample of establishments in the industry.7 
Among customer service and sales centers, the wireline segment em-
ploys 70 percent of the workforce, while the wireless industry employs 
14.6 percent; cable TV, 11.1 percent; and the Internet, 4.8 percent. It is 
also noteworthy that the majority of the workforce (53 percent) serves 
the residential or mass market segment, where wages are lower, work is 
more routinized, and working conditions are more onerous than in cen-
ters serving business customers (see Batt 2000). Among the technical 
workforce, 76 percent work for wireline local exchange carriers, 6 per-
cent for long distance wireline carriers, 7.6 percent for Internet provid-
ers, 5.5 percent for cable TV, and 3.2 percent for wireless. Thus, the 
overwhelming bulk of the workforce continues to be employed in wire-
line services (Table 3). 
Despite this seeming stability, dramatic employment shifts have 
occurred in this industry, which have led to serious declines in unioniza-
tion. For the telephone communications industry alone (SIC 481), 
unionization declined from 55.5 percent to 27.7 percent of the entire 
workforce between 1983 and 1998 (CPS 1999). However, de-unioniza-
tion accelerated in the third phase of restructuring due in part to the 
dramatic growth in demand for Internet and wireless services. Unioni-
zation fell by a total of 23 percent, from 55.5 to 42.5 percent between 
1983 and 1991, but 35 percent (42.5 to 27.7 percent) between 1991 and 
1998. For the key nonmanagement occupational groups, unionization 
fell from 63 percent to 32 percent for customer service and sales work-
ers and from 67 percent to 48 percent for technical workers between 
1983 and 1998. 
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The accelerating decline in unionization is accounted for by three 
factors. First, the former Bell companies substantially downsized the 
unionized workforce in their regulated wireline operations, by 60 per-
cent at AT&T and about 30 percent among the regional Bell companies 
(Keefe and Batt 1997). Second, employment grew dramatically in new 
nonunion wireless, data, and Internet enterprises, both among the for-
mer Bell affiliates and the new entrants. New entrants in the long dis-
tance, cable TV, and wireless industries have been fiercely antiunion. It 
is only recently that the CWA is gaining membership in the long dis-
tance segment, as Verizon and SBC become long distance providers 
under the provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Third, for-
mer Bell companies successfully classified new technical and profes-
sional positions as managerial and outside the collective bargaining unit 
despite the fact that the jobs did not contain supervisory responsibilities. 
The unions have challenged these classifications through grievance and 
arbitration procedures and in collective bargaining but have reclaimed 
only a small number of positions through these processes. Managerial 
employment has grown at almost a 5 percent annual rate since 1984, 
while nonmanagement employment has declined at a 2 percent annual 
rate during the same period (Keefe 1999). 
These changes not only have led to de-unionization but have pro-
foundly reshaped the union s base of power in the industry. Increasingly, 
the unions are isolated on a wireline island. For example, based on our 
1998 national survey of establishments, we found that 98.5 percent of 
unionized customer service and sales workers work in the wireline seg-
ment, and 95.6 percent of unionized technicians work on the local wire-
line infrastructure (Table 3). In addition, unionized workers increasingly 
are concentrated in the less skilled occupational groups. Historically, the 
unions represented all nonmanagerial employees, ranging from the 
most skilled to the least skilled occupational groups. The shift has 
occurred over time as new technologies have led to the demand for new 
skills and former Bell companies have defined the new occupational 
positions as outside of bargaining unit employment. 
For example, historically the most skilled groups were the network 
technicians who installed and maintained the analog transmission and 
switching equipment. Among the technical workforce, the shift from 
analog to digital systems has led to the employment of thousands of 
technical workers with computer skills who frequently have job classifi-
cations defined as managerial. In our 1998 survey, none of the establish-
ments that hired college-educated technicians were unionized. Among 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 277 
TABLE 3 
National Survey of Telecommunications Services Establishment: Distribution of 
Employment and Unionization by Industry Segment 
Occupational group 
Customer service 
and sales reps 
Industry segment 
Wireline 
Wireless 
Cable TV 
Internet service 
providers 
Subtotal 
Technicians 
Industry segment 
Wireline local 
Wireline long distance 
Wireless 
Cable TV 
Internet service 
providers 
Customer premise 
equipment 
Subtotal 
No. of 
establish-
ments 
187 
85 
57 
25 
354 
94 
24 
17 
23 
39 
11 
208 
- No. of 
workers 
26,349 
5,514 
4,197 
1,834 
37,894 
19,800 
1,553 
835 
1,435 
1,989 
475 
26,087 
%of 
Establish-
ments 
52.8 
24.0 
16.1 
7.1 
100.0 
45.2 
11.5 
8.2 
11.1 
18.8 
5.3 
100.0 
% Distribution % 
- %of 
Workers 
69.5 
14.6 
11.1 
4.8 
100.0 
75.9 
6.0 
3.2 
5.5 
7.6 
1.8 
100.0 
of union 
establish-
ments 
92.6 
1.9 
5.5 
0.0 
100.0 
83.1 
6.5 
1.3 
2.6 
1.3 
5.2 
100.0 
Distribution 
of union 
workers 
98.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
100.0 
95.6 
1.0 
0.3 
0.7 
0.9 
1.6 
100.0 
customer service and sales workers there has been a growth of sales jobs 
(filled by college-educated account managers and sales executives) serv-
ing business customers, which similarly have been defined as outside of 
the collective bargaining unit. Based on our 1998 survey, we found that 
only 8 percent of these workers are unionized. Finally, in operator ser-
vices, an historic union stronghold, ongoing automation has led to 
employment decline. While operators represented 60 percent of all 
telephone employment in the 1920s and 45 percent in the 1950s, they 
represent less than 5 percent in 2000. 
Labor-Management Relations: Consolidation and the Viability 
of Partnership Strategies 
The structure of collective bargaining and the tenor of relations 
between the unions and management have been profoundly influenced 
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by the course of industry restructuring over the past thirty years. At the 
beginning of the first phase of restructuring, for example, the unions 
and AT&T had just agreed to a two-tiered national bargaining structure 
(as opposed to the prior system of local telephone company bargaining). 
Between 1973 and 1984, AT&T bargained with the CWA and the IBEW 
at two levels. At the national level, Bell System-wide agreements stan-
dardized wage increases, benefits, and employment security. At the local 
bargaining level, individual Bell Operating Companies bargained with 
local union leadership over work administration and work rules. Local 
bargaining issues included overtime policy, posting of schedules, steps 
in the grievance process, health and safety, and absence pay. 
In the second phase of restructuring brought on by the breakup of 
the Bell System, however, the structure of collective bargaining became 
the most contentious issue in bargaining. When the companies rejected 
the CWAs proposal for centralized bargaining, CWA pressed for contin-
uance of the two-tier structure, with the first tier at the enterprise level 
(AT&T and the regional Bells) and local bargaining remaining at the 
operating company level. Eventually, all the RBOCs would opt for this 
two-tier structure. However, AT&T succeeded in removing itself from 
the common expiration dates established in telephone bargaining. It 
renegotiated the termination date of its 1983 contract to May 31, 1986, 
while the RBOC contracts all expired on August 9, 1986. In the subse-
quent four rounds of bargaining (1986, 1989, 1992, and 1995), AT&T 
would remain the economic pattern setter under a loose pattern frame-
work (Keefe and Boroff 1994; Batt and Keefe 1999). The core issues in 
the loose AT&T pattern bargaining structure were compensation, health 
care, employment security, and union institutional security, including 
the right to organize at new subsidiaries. 
In the third phase of restructuring, however, as the market power 
and success of AT&T has declined, so too has its role as a labor relations 
leader and pattern setter. In its place, the leading integrated megacarri-
ers, Verizon and SBC, have emerged as not only the largest service 
providers but the innovators in collective bargaining and labor relations. 
Part of this change is accounted for by the political maneuvers of the 
unions in legislative and regulatory arenas. Because the regional Bell 
companies are regulated by the state public service commissions 
(PSCs), the unions historically have been able to go to state regulators to 
push for PSC intervention in instances where consumer and labor inter-
ests coincide (for example, where staffing levels are too low to meet ser-
vice quality standards). In the 1990s, however, the opportunities for 
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union political leverage increased as Bell companies sought changes in 
state rate structures, as they sought PSC approval of plans to open their 
local markets to competition (as required by the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act), and as they sought state and federal approval of their merg-
ers and acquisitions. The CWA decided it was willing to enter into 
strategic partnerships to support Verizon's and SBC's business plans, on 
condition that these companies provide decent contracts, employment 
security, and neutrality and card check at all subsidiaries. The union's 
organizing strategy relies on using its existing relationships with the in-
cumbents in the traditional wireline businesses to gain access to the new 
markets and employees. 
The process and outcomes for the parties at Verizon and SBC, how-
ever, have been radically different. At Verizon, the process of merger 
among NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and GTE has undermined strategic part-
nerships that were emerging between the unions and NYNEX and GTE 
prior to their merger into the larger entity. Despite major union gains in 
collective bargaining, a series of strikes and labor-management distrust 
have led to ongoing fights over agreed-upon contract language, prevent-
ing implementation of a partnership strategy. At SBC, by contrast, the 
partnership strategy emerged incrementally over several years, through 
several rounds of conflicts that have nonetheless been settled through 
negotiation. While union wages and benefits do not quite match those 
in the Verizon contract, the hallmark of CWA-SBC partnership is union 
institutional security in exchange for union support of mergers and cor-
porate growth. Since 1996, SBC has kept its commitments to neutrality 
and card check language for workers in its nonunion enterprises, result-
ing in union organizing victories for 11,000 workers at SBC's Cingular 
wireless operations. In the sections following, we examine in more detail 
the development of these partnership efforts and the explanation for 
their successes and failures. 
Verizon-CWA: Failed Partnership 
In the 1980s, a partnership strategy was not part of the union-man-
agement landscape in the Northeast. While all other CWA districts 
accepted health care concessions in the 1980s, CWA District 1 in New 
York and the IBEW in New England joined forces in 1989 to retain tra-
ditional health care coverage. Through a bitter seventeen-week strike, 
the unions forced NYNEX to continue providing full health care cover-
age, without a copay or HMO. The win was due in large part to new 
mobilization strategies developed in the postdivestiture environment 
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and borrowed from the public sector where workers do not have the 
right to strike. Union member mobilization coupled with public mobi-
lization resulted in the denial of NYNEX's request for a rate increase 
before the New York State PSC. 
CWAs Mobilization Strategy. CWAs member mobilization at NYNEX 
began shortly after 1986 bargaining. The issue was straightforward: pre-
serve your health benefits. Mobilization consisted of workplace cam-
paigns to involve every union member in actively representing his or her 
interests through collective action. Mobilization tactics included rallies, 
petitions, one-on-one postcard messages, wearing red clothing or arm 
bands, workplace coordinated stand-ups, work-to-rule campaigns, orga-
nizing nonmembers, information picket lines, electronic picket lines, 
and community support activities. 
CWA also needed to put public pressure on the company in order to 
win the strike. In New York, the union had been actively involved in 
local and state politics for decades. CWA President Morty Bahr was an 
early supporter of Mario Cuomo when he entered political life. In 1989, 
Cuomo was the governor of New York. When it came to state regulatory 
issues, historically the union had either passively or actively supported 
the company. When the 1989 strike began, however, the union launched 
a public mobilization campaign to defeat NYNEX's request for rate 
increase before the state PSC. The public mobilization involved citizen 
petitions, alliances with consumer groups, publicly exposing poor-quality 
service in the Bronx and Brooklyn, ads in newspapers, and filings before 
the New York State PSC. 
Public mistakes committed by the company earlier in the year 
greatly aided the union s public campaign. NYNEX had been convicted 
of criminally inflating its rate base to overcharge customers through the 
rate-setting process. The adverse publicity was accentuated when sev-
eral executives of a deregulated subsidiary were caught sponsoring sex 
parties in Florida for some of their major clients. This gained NYNEX 
considerable attention from the New York tabloids. The unions public 
campaign against the company was further fueled by the death of a 
picketer in Westchester. The daughter of a company director who was 
crossing a picket line to work during the strike panicked and acciden-
tally drove her vehicle into a picketer, killing him. The very public 
funeral was widely covered by the press and was followed by a sponta-
neous rank-and-file network sabotage campaign in Westchester County, 
the home of major corporations such as IBM. 
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The unions' concerted attack on NYNEX was successful when the 
PSC denied the rate increase. Since New York accounted for 65 percent 
of company revenue, the denial put considerable pressure on NYNEX, 
which was already the worst financially performing RBOC. Competition 
became another source of financial pressure that was unfamiliar to the 
company. In Manhattan, the most lucrative telecommunications market 
in the world, Teleport made a substantial effort to take the "high-cap" 
market by offering quick installation of high-capacity fiber links to major 
Wall Street firms. 
After seventeen weeks of strike and the direct intervention of the 
governor, NYNEX relented, and the union-represented workforce re-
tained their traditional health benefits. A considerable amount of inter-
nal CWA analysis, discussion, and debate followed the unions success. 
What made this strike different from its failed seven-month strike in 
1971? The union concluded that its success was a result of the changing 
political economy of the industry, its political involvement throughout 
the state of New York, and the public mobilization campaign. Defeating 
the rate increase was the decisive step in the union victory. 
Since 1989, CWA's mobilization programs in telecommunications 
have steadily improved in their effectiveness. In 1992, rather than strike, 
CWA continued to bargain after contracts expired at AT&T, Bell Atlantic, 
Pacific Telesis, and US West. Member mobilization was coordinated 
through electronic town meetings, conference calls, and taped telephone 
messages, which kept members involved and informed about bargaining 
progress. At AT&T, the unions threatened an electronic picket line by 
getting all their supporters to pledge to switch their long distance phone 
service to another carrier until a contract was signed. Some CWA locals 
increasingly demonstrated their mastery of information technologies in 
getting the union s story out to their members and to management. CWA 
also further developed its in-workplace strategies. The union believed 
that these tactics grow in power as employers increasingly rely on a com-
mitted and involved workforce to provide superior customer service. 
CWA Wins 1995 Contract Through Public Relations Campaign. In 
the 1995 negotiations, mobilization again proved an effective tool to 
support the unions bargaining objectives. This time, the key contract 
fight occurred at Bell Atlantic, which then covered New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington, 
DC. The company launched an aggressive concession strategy. The cir-
cumstances were particularly difficult because, in contrast to NYNEX, 
the CWA and IBEW did not form a coalition against Bell Atlantic. Instead, 
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Bell Atlantic first bargained with IBEW and reached an agreement that 
guaranteed job security in exchange for a two-tier wage structure.8 The 
CWA was outraged that Bell Atlantic forced an agreement in this man-
ner and destabilized bargaining structure. In addition, CWA did not 
view a strike as viable because the union at Bell Atlantic was only able to 
maintain picket lines for about three weeks in 1989 before accepting the 
company's proposal. 
Given these circumstances, the union developed a strategy linking 
internal mobilization, the threat of a regionwide strike, a public relations 
campaign, a lobbying effort on service quality at the state PSCs, and a 
national-level initiative to postpone signing the Telecommunications Act 
into law. The 1995 CWA national convention also passed a resolution 
providing the leadership with access to the strike fund to conduct public 
relations campaigns in support of collective bargaining. 
At Bell Atlantic, employees worked without a contract from August 
7, 1995, until January 1996. The union built an internal mobilization 
that gained national visibility when more than 1,000 Bell Atlantic of 
Pennsylvania employees were suspended for wearing T-shirts proclaim-
ing, "We Won't Be Road Kill on the Information Superhighway." Work-
ers reported high levels of acrimony at work, and they particularly 
resented the unilaterally imposed forced overtime policies and wide-
spread use of subcontractors to perform traditional telephone work. 
After several well-placed leaks to the news media, the state PSCs inves-
tigated service quality during this period, found repeated violations of 
service standards, and ordered the company to hire an additional 500 
customer service representatives, among other things. 
Most effective, however, was the CWA's coordinated public relations 
campaign that relied on newspaper, radio, and television ads. The union 
commercials attacked the company's public-image making and ques-
tioned whether Bell Atlantic was "the Heart of Communications or Just 
Heartless?" In December 1995, CWA began to air a television ad about 
Larry—a slob of a subcontractor instead of a well-trained technician, 
who could be sent to your house by Bell Atlantic. Rude and poorly trained, 
Larry could destroy your home. The humorous ad was an immediate 
success; customers who called for installations or repairs emphasized 
that they did not want Larry sent to their home. Radio and newspaper 
ads encouraged customers to check for identification to see if techni-
cians were real Bell Atlantic employees. 
Shortly after Larry appeared, negotiations resumed, with Bell 
Atlantic vice chairmen Jim Cullen and Larry Babio at the table. Larry, 
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the name of the central character in the ad, was chosen because the 
union believed Larry Babio, along with Ray Smith the CEO, repre-
sented their major roadblock. Bell Atlantic's aggressive contract conces-
sion strategy backfired after six months of intense union-management 
hostility and negative publicity. The contract was settled within the 
AT&T lead pattern, although CWA was forced to accept BACCSI, 
except in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, CWA was able to achieve an 11 
percent wage increase over three years, no retiree copay for health 
insurance, a 12 to 14 percent pension increase, and no two-tier settle-
ment. The national CWA union then settled the remaining contracts 
with regional Bell companies in accordance with the AT&T pattern. 
NYNEX Pays to Reign in the Union's Public Mobilization Tactics. At 
NYNEX, the bitter 1989 strike led the company to rethink its labor rela-
tions strategy and attempt a more positive bargaining relationship. In 
1991, NYNEX hired James Dowdall as the vice president of labor rela-
tions. During his many years with AT&T labor relations, he had devel-
oped a good working relationship with Morty Bahr, president of CWA. 
Dowdall immediately sought to break the dynamics of mobilization and 
strike at NYNEX by extending the existing contract until 1995 and by 
providing generous 4 percent annual wage increases. 
Similarly, when NYNEX decided to downsize 22,800 employees in 
December 1993, it followed up with early bargaining in spring 1994, 
which resulted in the most far-reaching retraining, transfer, and employ-
ment security system in the industry. As detailed in the next section, 
Collective Bargaining Outcomes, the 1994 contract provided a special 
retirement incentive, no layoff clauses, and an extensive retraining and 
transfer program. In return, CWA District 1 in New York signed a cease 
and desist letter of understanding, surrendering its ability to fight the 
company legislatively or before the PSC and to cease its public relations 
campaign against NYNEX. They would also eventually support the com-
pany's merger with Bell Atlantic, its petition at the New York PSC to be-
come the first Bell company to gain access to the long distance market, 
and the Bell Atlantic merger with GTE. In 1997, NYNEX merged with 
Bell Atlantic. The merged company retained two labor relations vice 
presidents, one for the North (the former NYNEX) and one for the South 
(the former Bell Atlantic). In 1998, Bell Atlantic pursued early bargain-
ing but with separate negotiations for the North and South. 
In the North, the key issue was a contract clause requiring the com-
pany to offer to every eligible employee, prior to the contract expiration 
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in August 1998, the 1994-negotiated pension enhancement. While esti-
mates of eligible employees ranged from 6,000 to 14,000, both parties 
knew that Bell Atlantic North could not operate its network if all eligible 
employees accepted the buyout. The company sought to postpone the 
offer date for two years, a proposal the union accepted in exchange for 
substantial pension enhancements and decent wage gains. By April 15, 
1998, the two sides had hammered out an agreement, but the union 
would not sign it until the Bell Atlantic South agreement was worked out. 
Bargaining in the South stalled on three key issues: forced overtime, 
subcontracting, and organizing rights. Forced overtime dominated the 
agenda. The issue was a holdover from 1995 bargaining when CWA in 
the Potomac region had used overtime strikes (workers refused to work 
overtime as a tactic in its 1995 internal mobilization) when it worked 
without a contract. In response, the company implemented forced over-
time, assigning employees specific days they were required to be avail-
able to work. Hundreds of employees were suspended for refusing to 
work during this period; but because they were without a contract the 
union could not take these cases to arbitration. The company continued 
the practice of forced overtime after the contract was settled in 1996. 
CWA would allege in an arbitration case following the strike that the 
company was violating a long-standing past practice in continuing to 
force its members to work overtime once the contract was settled. In 
1997, however, the union lost the arbitration case. In 1998 bargaining, 
therefore, the union demanded that forced overtime be eliminated. 
Local bargainers would eventually settle for a ten- to fifteen-hour cap 
on forced overtime comparable to language in other agreements. 
Nonetheless, these three outstanding issues in the South resulted in a 
regionwide strike on August 7 and 8, involving both the North and South 
and requiring the CEO, Ivan Seidenberg, to intervene. Seidenberg 
quickly accepted the union demands on subcontracting, neutrality, and 
card check, with one exception. Bell Atlantic Mobile (the company's 
staunchly antiunion cellular subsidiary) would be exempt from the orga-
nizing rights language. Although the contract contained many generous 
provisions, the membership in the South remained dissatisfied with the 
overtime provisions and in 1999 voted out incumbent leaders in the five 
largest locals in the district. The Bell Atlantic-CWA relationship, however, 
would be increasingly standardized on the NYNEX model. In exchange 
for these advances, the CWA became an important ally in Bell Atlantic's 
effort to merge with GTE and form Verizon, while simultaneously making 
some progress toward bringing GTE into the newly emerging pattern. 
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Failed Partnership at Verizon. With the formation of Verizon in 
spring 2000, just before bargaining was to begin, the prospects for 
union-management partnership initially looked promising. The man-
agement table was to be led by Randy McDonald, the head of human 
resources at GTE and co-architect (with Morty Bahr) of a successful 
partnership between GTE and the CWA. McDonald and Bahr had 
developed a personal relationship of trust and did road shows together 
to illustrate the viability of their joint strategy—one built on the union s 
support for technological innovation and corporate mergers before reg-
ulators in exchange for good wages, benefits, and employment and 
union security. McDonald was handpicked by Chuck Lee, the former 
CEO of GTE, and appeared to have good support among managers at 
GTE and the former Bell Atlantic. Just before bargaining began, how-
ever, McDonald mysteriously left Verizon for the top HR position at 
IBM, leaving a vacuum in bargaining leadership that was not filled. 
Both management and the unions had the complex challenge of unit-
ing disparate units behind a common agenda. It turned out that the 
unions had a more difficult task of uniting its leadership in districts 1 
(NYNEX), 2 (the Potomac region), and 13 (Pennsylvania). The unions 
main issue was neutrality and card check at Verizon Wireless in the for-
mer Bell Atlantic North and South regions (covering thirteen states and 
Washington, DC). On the day the contract was to expire, the company 
conditionally agreed to card check and limited neutrality at Verizon 
Wireless in return for no strike at the newly formed Verizon Communi-
cations. Nevertheless, a regionwide CWA and IBEW strike commenced 
that night: though wage and benefits issues were settled, a variety of 
work administration and employment security issues remained. 
During the first five days of the strike, regionwide issues on employ-
ment security and a special agreement covering service representatives at 
call centers were completed. Local issues dominated the remainder of the 
strike, after the neutrality and card check issues were once again finally 
concluded. Frustration over forced overtime in the South would eventu-
ally block a settlement and lead to a schism between North and South. 
Many of the new local leaders in CWA District 2 (in the Potomac region) 
had run on a platform of no forced overtime—a position the company 
consistently and adamantly rejected. On Thursday of the second week of 
the strike, the company agreed to an eight-hour cap on forced overtime. 
The regional bargaining leaderships then instructed the local bargainers 
to wrap up their negotiations by Sunday night of the second week, when 
the strike would end. Thinking that the strike would soon conclude, the 
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national leadership, including Bahr, departed for Anaheim, California, 
where the CWA national convention would open the following week. 
On Sunday afternoon, however, the bargaining committee in the 
South rejected the proposed settlement, largely on the forced overtime 
issue. The South would remain on strike for an additional four days, as 
the North, both CWA and IBEW, returned to work. During the next 
several days, busloads of picketers from the South would be sent to New 
York in an effort to block their return to work. The CWA leaders in the 
North were surprised and outraged. Toward the end of the strike s sec-
ond week, the CWA district vice presidents and other officers had met 
and agreed to accept the proposed contracts and return to work on 
Sunday evening. CWA in the North and the IBEW in turn informed 
management that they accepted their contracts pending ratification and, 
consequently, were legally obligated to order their members to return to 
work. Ultimately, the South was forced to settle their continuing strike 
without any additional improvements. The union leaders in the South, 
however, would blame the North for the continuance of forced overtime 
in their contracts. 
In the wake of 2000 bargaining, all parties felt betrayed. Even though 
the union gained desired language, CWA failed to advance its goal of a 
strategic partnership with the industry leader, Verizon. Instead, the com-
pany stiffened its arms'-length dealings. Eighteen months into the neu-
trality and card check agreement at Verizon Wireless, no employee had 
yet gained the right to collective bargaining under card check, as a vari-
ety of disputed issues were in arbitration. In response, CWA opposed 
Verizon's entry into long distance in Pennsylvania. At the local level, a 
large number of dismissals were also meted out for alleged strike-related 
violence and sabotage. After Verizon agreed to arbitration, most of the 
discharged strikers were reinstated. Nonetheless, these skirmishes con-
sumed the first year of postbargaining labor relations. 
Clearly, strategic partnership has not arrived at Verizon. Instead, a 
low-trust relationship prevails at the higher levels of the union and man-
agement, based on pervasive hostility that is fueled both by a mutual 
sense of betrayal and by internal political conflict and animosity within 
both CWA and Verizon. 
SBC Communications—CWA's Strategic Partner? 
In contrast to the chaotic union-management relations at Verizon, the 
CWA (initially District 6 and now expanded to districts 4 and 9) and SBC 
have stabilized a strategic partnership that exchanges union organizing 
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rights for union support of corporate regulatory and legislative efforts. 
In 1998, SBC and the CWA settled an early contract that broke with the 
AT&T pattern. The SBC neutrality and card check language and the 
SBC-CWA relationship set the standard for the industry. Following the 
CWA-SBC settlement terms were contract agreements at Pacific Telesis 
and Ameritech, which had merged with SBC. These contracts each pro-
vided for significant wage improvements and expansive union organiz-
ing rights. Each SBC company also agreed to thirty-two-month con-
tracts with CWA that would expire off the August cycle, in April 2001. 
In addition, in 1998 the Connecticut Telephone Workers Union (repre-
senting workers at SNET) merged with the CWA and was represented 
for the first time as a CWA affiliate. After a one-month strike, the union 
signed a thirty-two-month contract, bringing them into the SBC bar-
gaining orbit, as SNET merged with SBC. 
The SBC-CWA partnership emerged as a result of a concerted union 
effort, beginning in 1992, to reconstruct their relationship based on 
mutual support. CWA had always supported SBC's (then Southwestern 
Bell) positions in the state legislature and PSCs. However, in 1992 when 
the union tried to organize workers in the company's wireless subsidiary, 
Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems (SBMS), it met with classic antiunion 
suppression campaigns. The union explained it could not continue to pro-
vide political support for the company's regulatory agenda nor cooperate 
in the traditional wireline business while the company set up antiunion 
subsidiaries, particularly in wireless, that tenaciously fought unionization. 
During the next five years, the CWA in District 6 undertook a sus-
tained public and internal mobilization campaign to organize SBC 
Wireless. Internally the union had to educate members about the strate-
gic importance of organizing the growing wireless business and to gain 
their participation in organizing campaigns. Externally, the union con-
ducted demonstrations, filed board charges, and bargained hard over its 
participation in SBC legislative and regulatory affairs. Early on, the 
CWA decided on a policy of balanced participation and assistance condi-
tioned on progress at the wireless subsidiary. In 1993, for example, SBC 
was pressing for state legislation that would regulate providers who were 
trying to access the SBC infrastructure and require them to build a cer-
tain amount of the infrastructure in every state served by SBC. CWA 
helped SBC pass the legislation in Kansas in exchange for an agreement 
on union job growth in the state (CWA 1997). 
However, the "partnership" only emerged through a series of corpo-
rate antiunion campaigns and union organizing defeats, internal mobilizing 
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and angry public demonstrations by the union, and incremental gains in 
neutrality agreements negotiated over five years. For example, despite an 
initial neutrality agreement signed in 1992, the SB MS continued to hire 
consultants to run antiunion campaigns and successfully defeat union elec-
tions through 1994. The campaigns surprised and angered CWA members 
who traditionally viewed the company as paternalistic. The corporation's 
behavior fueled member activism, and, by 1994, the union had trained 350 
member organizers and counted fifteen locals directly involved in cam-
paigns. In 1995, to redress specific violations at one site, the company 
signed expanded neutrality agreements that included mediation and arbi-
tration of disputes. The union, in turn, helped mobilize 5,000 members to 
lobby for SBC before the state legislature. In another instance, the SBC 
asked CWA for help when it learned the city council of San Antonio was 
accepting bids to lease its fiber optic ring to a Canadian consortium. The 
CWAs San Antonio local turned out 200 members at one meeting, and 
600 at a second, leading to the proposals defeat (CWA 1997). 
In a fourth agreement, the company approached the union because it 
wanted to open pilot stores to sell both wireline and wireless services 
("one-stop shopping") in Houston and Austin. The company offered to 
accept card check recognition at these sites if, after one year, the company 
decided to continue the operation. Yet, in 1996, a new antiunion regional 
manager in SBMS again ran a tough antiunion campaign, leading to a 
union defeat in the election. Then, with the passage of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act, SBC again approached the union to gain support for 
its efforts to regulate competitors' access to local service in five states. By 
1997, it also sought CWA support for its merger with Pacific Telephone. 
After talks with CWA leaders in districts 6 and 9 (representing Pacific 
Telephone), SBC announced the formation of two new subsidiaries and 
gave CWA recognition to both. It then negotiated card check agreements 
for the other SBC subsidiaries. The agreement covered all lines of busi-
ness, including current and future subsidiaries for all in-region operations 
of SBC. It granted worksite access for organizers, card check recognition 
by a simple majority, bargaining units based on the earliest date that 
appears on the cards turned in to the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), and arbitration of all disputes. Since then, this language has been 
extended to all U.S. subsidiaries of SBC, even those operating outside the 
SBC regional footprints. SBC has gained the complete support of CWA in 
regulatory, legislative, and political affairs (CWA 1997). 
In 2001 bargaining, SBC's contracts with CWA were scheduled to 
expire in April. SBC was interested in getting bargaining accomplished 
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prior to the expiration. The CWA informed the company that many of 
the 10,000 workers that the CWA organized at SBC's wireless subsidiary 
(now called Cingular) were without first contracts. Early bargaining 
would be contingent on settling these first contracts. Larry Cohen, 
CWA's executive vice president, led the negotiations at Cingular. These 
talks produced surprisingly decent first contracts in wireless units in sev-
eral states in the Midwest, New England, and mid-Atlantic regions. 
With wireless bargaining completed, the CWA and SBC units at South-
west Bell, Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, Ameritech, and SNET negotiated a 
new contract, incorporating the key economic features of the Verizon 
agreement—wages, pensions, and special provisions for call centers. 
Negotiations were completed a month before contract expiration. Later, 
in August 2001, the CWA in District 3 (BellSouth) succeeded in negoti-
ating a card check and neutrality agreement for 10,000 additional work-
ers at Cingular Wireless in the nine-state BellSouth region, while also 
incorporating key features of the Verizon agreement. 
Downward Departure from the Pattern: AT&T and Qwest/US West 
As Verizon and SBC have become the consolidated industry giants, 
the union has sought to use contract gains with these companies to set 
new national patterns. AT&T, by contrast, has lost its pattern-leading 
position. By the late 1990s, however, pattern bargaining in general has 
eroded. While a loose relationship exists among Verizon, SBC, and 
BellSouth, their contracts no longer have common expiration dates. 
AT&T, Qwest, and Lucent have diverged more substantially, both in 
terms of content and expiration dates. 
AT&T has continued to grapple with its long-term inability to grow 
revenue in core telecommunications. Its erratic business strategy has 
been accompanied by a consistent labor strategy: shedding union employ-
ees and cutting labor costs. The company's union workforce dropped 
from 250,000 at divestiture to 103,000 in 1994, to 48,000 in 1998, and 
31,000 in 2001. AT&T's only unionized operation is AT&T long distance, 
which has remained the largest long distance company but has struggled 
with excess capacity, declining prices for its services, and new competition 
from Verizon and SBC. While the CWA negotiated a neutrality provision 
and expedited election process at AT&T and has organized about 3,000 
workers in broadband and local service divisions, management often re-
sists the process and forces issues into arbitration. 
To force AT&T to reverse its labor relations practices, CWA sued the 
company in 2001. The union filed a shareholder rights lawsuit, charging 
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that AT&T was trying to adopt an illegal process to amend its charter so 
that only a simple majority of shareholder votes, not the required two-
thirds, could authorize AT&T's major restructuring. Managements plan 
to split AT&T into three companies with four separate stock listings— 
broadband, wireless, business services, and consumer long distance— 
was drawing considerable criticism, as its plan to acquire TCI and 
MediaOne had done earlier. According to CWA, the restructuring plan 
would move AT&T even further from a bundled telecommunications 
services strategy, a successful strategy adopted by all of its major com-
petitors (CWA 2001). To fight AT&T's decision, CWA mobilized a public 
campaign leading up to the AT&T stockholders meeting. The union also 
conducted a conference call to numerous Wall Street firms in which it 
criticized the details of the AT&T divestiture plan. Publicly, the union 
criticized AT&T management for running the company for the benefit 
of themselves and the investment bankers who benefit enormously from 
the mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and carve-outs. 
The union's public mobilization strategy was successful in that it 
compelled AT&T senior management to negotiate with the CWA. This 
resulted in a temporary reversal of AT&T's policies. In return, CWA 
withdrew its lawsuit and its opposition to the AT&T plan. Nonetheless, 
as the downsized and fractured AT&T struggles to define its business 
strategy, it is increasingly in conflict with the CWA. As the union pre-
pared for 2002 bargaining, it openly challenged CEO Michael Arm-
strong's alleged mismanagement: CWA opposed the proposed merger 
between AT&T Broadband and Comcast, which values the AT&T 
Broadband assets below half of what AT&T recently paid for them. At 
the same time, the merger provides Armstrong with the job of chairman 
of the new merged entity. The union wanted BellSouth to acquire 
AT&T, which would make it the third megacarrier in the industry. 
At Qwest, CWA also conducted a two-week strike in 1998 to oppose 
the implementation of individual-based performance pay and to place 
limits on forced overtime. The union conducted a public mobilization cam-
paign, focusing on the growing number of US West service failures. The 
union had not adequately prepared for its public mobilization campaign 
and was unable to defeat the individual-based compensation plan. How-
ever, it did limit forced overtime to sixteen hours a week in 1999 and 
eight hours per week in 2001. The Qwest/US West agreement is the only 
Bell contract where management has gained individual-based perfor-
mance pay for technicians and commission pay for service representatives. 
In 2000, Qwest/US West bargained early and reached a settlement in 
November, which fell short of the other major contracts in the industry. 
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The agreement provides a contract extension until August 2003. It pro-
vides for 3.5 percent and 5 percent wage increases and improved pen-
sions. The contract did not modify the individual-based compensation 
plan and lacks any provisions for neutrality, card check, expedited elec-
tion, or access of organizers to nonunion worksites at Qwest. The com-
pany was able to get a federal judge to enjoin the workplace mobilization 
practice of wearing black armbands. As a condition of the settlement, 
Qwest requested that the injunction be lifted. Qwest has been accused of 
highly aggressive accounting procedures in the wake of the Enron bank-
ruptcy and may be implicated in the bankruptcy of Global Crossing. 
Collective Bargaining Outcomes 
Our review of collective bargaining in the postdivestiture telecom-
munications industry examines wage levels and compensation strategies, 
employment security, union institutional security, and agreements spe-
cific to service and sales centers, where working conditions have become 
particularly onerous since divestiture. We draw on collective bargaining 
agreements and analyses of trends in the CPS data. We also compare 
human resource management strategies in union and nonunion work-
places by drawing on our 1998 national survey of telecommunications 
establishments. 
Wage Outcomes and Compensation Strategies 
Several trends in compensation stand out in the postdivestiture 
period. First, the Bell companies and unions have negotiated wage in-
creases that basically track the consumer price index. In fact, in succes-
sive rounds of bargaining, across-the-board wage increases rose as a per-
centage of base pay between 1986 and 2000. Second, despite the fact 
that collective bargaining was decentralized to the enterprise level, Bell 
companies continued to offer wages and benefits that formed a pattern 
until the late 1990s, when the pattern began to break down. Third, the 
union/nonunion wage gap was fairly small until 1990 but grew signifi-
cantly in the 1990s due to falling real wages in nonunion companies. 
Finally, the downward pressure of the union/nonunion compensation 
differential has led AT&T and the RBOCs to seek reductions in health 
care costs and to introduce various forms of contingent pay. 
Table 4 compares negotiated wage raises at AT&T and the regional 
Bell companies. The postdivestiture trend shows a steady increase in each 
successive contract. Across-the-board wage increases averaged 2.8 per-
cent between 1986 and 1994, but they rose on average from 2.2 percent 
to 
CD 
to 
AT&T 
SBC Ameritech 
Verizon Bell Atlantic 
BellSouth 
Verizon NYNEX 
SBC Pacific Telesis 
SBC Southwest Bell 
Qwest/US West 
Average change 
Average CPI change 
Real wage change 
Table 4 
Changes in Wage Compensation in CWA Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Percentage annual change Average annual 
postdivestiture 
1986-88 1989-91 1992-94 1995-98 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 wage changes 
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3.0 
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in 1986 to 3.3 percent in 1994. Slight variation in the pattern existed 
among the Bell companies, with BellSouth consistently negotiating the 
lowest annual increases (averaging 2 percent annually) and AT&T nego-
tiating the highest (3.2 percent on average). Previously negotiated cost-
of-living adjustments were restricted, suspended, or eliminated in all 
companies in 1986 bargaining. Loose pattern wage bargaining produced 
wage gains that were below the rate of inflation in the late 1980s, but by 
the mid-1990s, real wage gains had returned. 
Each company also pursued some form of contingent pay, which the 
unions resisted and treated as company add-ons outside of the basic 
economic package. By 1992, all of the former Bell affiliates, with the 
exception of NYNEX and US West, had negotiated one of these plans, 
which consisted of either profit sharing or "team" incentive awards 
(based on operational performance at an establishment or business unit 
level). In the 1990s, some companies shifted from profit sharing and 
team awards to stock ownership plans, while others (Verizon and SBC) 
offered both. All companies have also pushed for individual sales plans, 
which we discuss in the following section on service and sales workers. 
In addition, there has been an increased reliance on signing bonuses to 
ensure ratification. The former Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell, and US 
West introduced these bonuses in the 1980s. By 1995, five of the seven 
major contracts offered signing bonuses of between $500 and $1,500. 
The unions have negotiated various parameters for the contingent 
pay plans. For example, in 1992 and 1995, District 9, representing 
Pacific Telesis workers, negotiated trials of a group incentive plan with 
joint union-management team oversight. The union insisted that there 
be no take-aways, that the plan be self-funding (based on a productivity 
gains fund), and that it be easy to understand. In 1994, the NYNEX 
contract established a bonus based on meeting "team" (division-level) 
service and sales objectives. Data for 1995 to 1997 show that employees 
received stock and cash bonuses amounting to 3.23 percent. The 1995 
(former) Bell Atlantic contract allowed the company to create "team" 
incentive plans linked to operational objectives at the second-manager's 
level or above and limited to 5 percent of annual base pay (extended to 
10 percent in 2001), but since they were not funded by the agreement, 
no bonuses have been paid. 
The Union-Nonunion Wage Gap and Wage Inequality. Given the 
significant decline in unionization, one might expect that union wages 
would converge toward nonunion rates. However, the opposite has oc-
curred as indicated in Table 5.9 As de-unionization accelerated between 
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TABLE 5 
Growth of Wage Inequality Within Union and Nonunion Segments, by Occupation: 
Telecommunications Industry, 1983-1998 
Clerical and sales workers 
Union real weekly earningsa 
Median earnings 
10th percentile 
90th percentile 
Nonunion real weekly earnings11 
Median earnings 
10th percentile 
90th percentile 
Ratio 
Union/nonunion median 
real earnings 
Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile 
Union 
Nonunion 
Technical workers 
Union real weekly earningsa 
Median earnings 
10th percentile 
90th percentile 
Nonunion real weekly earningsa 
Median earnings 
10th percentile 
90th percentile 
Ratio 
Union/nonunion median real 
earnings 
Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile 
Union 
Nonunion 
1983 
$261 
$223 
$446 
$382 
$221 
$729 
0.95 
2.00 
3.30 
$488 
$351 
$602 
$502 
$241 
$753 
0.97 
1.71 
3.13 
1998 
$368 
$205 
$507 
$307 
$153 
$650 
1.20 
2.47 
4.12 
$515 
$283 
$736 
$405 
$215 
$706 
1.27 
2.60 
3.29 
Change (% 
1983-90 1990-98 
1.0 
-3.9 
3.0 
-5.7 
-13.4 
-16.0 
7.1 
7.1 
-3.0 
0.4 
-12.9 
1.6 
-2.5 
1.6 
1.6 
2.9 
16.7 
0.0 
0.9 
-4.2 
10.7 
-13.9 
-8.8 
13.0 
19.5 
16.5 
27.8 
5.1 
-6.6 
20.6 
-16.9 
-12.5 
-7.9 
28.1 
35.2 
5.1 
) 
1983-98 
1.8 
-8.1 
13.7 
-19.6 
-22.2 
-3.0 
26.7 
23.7 
24.8 
5.6 
-19.5 
22.2 
-19.3 
-10.9 
-6.3 
30.9 
51.8 
5.1 
Source: CPS merged annual earnings files (1999). 
a
 CPI-U adjusted. For methodological notes, see endnote 5. 
1990 and 1998, so too did the rise in the union/nonunion wage gap. 
Among clerical and sales workers, the ratio was .95 in 1983, 1.00 in 
1990, and 1.20 in 1998, a 19.5 percent rise from 1990 to 1998 and 26.7 
percent in total. Among technical workers, the ratio of union to 
nonunion median weekly wages was .97 in 1983, 1.00 in 1990, and 1.27 
in 1998, a 28 percent rise from 1990 to 1998 (31 percent rise overall). 
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These trends are due almost entirely to the precipitous fall in real wages 
of nonunion workers of over 19 percent over the period, for both tech-
nical and clerical and sales occupations. By contrast, union workers 
experienced small rises in the real wages over the period (5.6 percent 
for technical workers and 1.8 percent for clerical and sales workers over 
the period). These figures underestimate the differences in total com-
pensation, however, by failing to take into account the higher levels of 
nonwage benefits for union workers and the greater use of part-time 
and contingent staffing among nonunion employers. 
In addition, wage dispersion within both the union and nonunion 
segments increased. For clerical and sales workers, the 90/10 ratio of 
median weekly earnings rose to 2.47 for union workers (a 24 percent 
rise over the period) and to 4.12 for nonunion workers (a 25 percent 
rise). Among technical workers, the 90/10 ratio of median weekly earn-
ings rose to 2.60 for union workers (a 52 percent rise) and to 3.29 for 
nonunion workers (a 5 percent rise). Among nonunion technical work-
ers, wages fell for both the 90th and the 10th percentiles, but they fell 
somewhat more for the 10th percentile. Among union technical work-
ers, they rose 22 percent for the 90th percentile group, but fell dramati-
cally by 19.5 percent for the 10th percentile group. 
Employment Security 
Prior to divestiture, Bell System employees, union-represented and 
management alike, had secure jobs. Employment security was achieved 
by careful human resources planning and managed deployment of 
labor-displacing technology. AT&T retained employees in whom it had 
substantial human capital investments. The employees were decidedly 
loyal to the Bell System and its mission of providing universal, reliable 
telephone service. The spirit of service was the guiding shared value. 
Furthermore, the union leadership readily accepted technological 
advances in the workplace. A job control unionism, seeking security 
through highly detailed job classifications, never emerged in the indus-
try. Instead, most job classifications were extremely broad, making work 
assignments easier and the workforce more flexible. 
As a result of the Bell System s social contract, employment security 
issues were not paramount in predivestiture negotiations at the national 
level. There were several income protection programs bargained, notably 
the Supplemental Income Protection Program (SIPP) and the Voluntary 
Income Protection Program (VIPP), primarily to aid adjustment in 
Western Electric manufacturing. The former provided incentives for 
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early retirement; the latter provided separation income to junior employ-
ees who opted to resign. Furthermore, in 1980 AT&T signed an under-
standing with its unions that it would not subcontract "traditional tele-
phone work," where such subcontracting could directly result in layoffs, 
downgrading, or part-timing of regular employees. 
At the local level, contracts did contain language on force adjust-
ments, layoff procedures, and layoff pay. These provisions, generally, 
were "idle" in the contract, with the major exception of the employees 
in Western Electrics factories. This group of employees experienced the 
ups and downs of business cycles. The main workers permanently dislo-
cated by automation were operators, who could transfer to clerical or 
other office jobs, sometimes locally and sometimes if they were willing 
to move to a different region. 
Following divestiture, employment security became a central issue as 
AT&T cut 40,000 positions by 1985. As a result, AT&T and the CWA cre-
ated what became the model for training and career assistance: a jointly 
owned, nonprofit corporation, the Alliance for Employee Growth and 
Development, designed to provide training and career development for 
both displaced workers and active employees. The parties also bargained 
an automated employee transfer system, called AT&T Transfer System 
(ATS), providing active and laid-off employees with real-time informa-
tion about job openings nationwide. Between 1986 and 1992, the 
Alliance spent about $80 million serving 59,451 union members (60 per-
cent of whom were active employees) (Batt and Osterman 1993). The 
Alliance was widely recognized as performing an heroic task on a small 
budget (compared to AT&T's annual training budget of $300 million). 
Several of the regional Bell companies negotiated similar training and in-
ternal transfer programs, though not as well financed as the Alliance. 
Ongoing downsizing in the 1980s and early 1990s occurred almost 
entirely through attrition (with the exception of AT&T), and companies 
offered good severance and early-retirement packages. Pacific Tele-
phone and Southwestern Bell agreed to no-layoff clauses. Table 6 sum-
marizes employment security provisions at the RBOCs and AT&T. 
A new industry standard for employment security was negotiated in 
1994 by NYNEX and the CWA, and extended in 1998 in the contract 
covering former NYNEX employees. The 1994 contract provided a spe-
cial retirement incentive that added six years to both service and age. It 
also included a 30 percent social security supplement until age 62 or a 
$500 annual bonus, whichever is greater. The incentive program was de-
signed to reduce the nonmanagement workforce by 30 percent (16,800 
TABLE 6 
CWA's Postdivestiture Employment Security Bargaining Outcomes 
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 
AT&T 
Bell Atlantic-
Verizon 
BellSouth 
NYNEX-Bell 
Atlantic North-
Verizon 
Pacific Telesis-
SBC 
Job information center. 
Alliance created. Income 
protection enhanced. 
Ameritech-SBC No change 
Job information center 
for displaced employees. 
Career continuation 
program. 
Priority placement for 
displaced workers. Income 
protection program 
enhanced. 
No layoff agreement. 
Automated transfer system. 
Displaced worker priority. 
Income protection enhanced. 
Relocation allowance 
increased. Medical benefits of 
laid-off employees expanded. 
Incentives for early retirement. 
Employee career resource 
centers. Income 
protection enhanced. 
Employment security 
partnership. 
Incentives for early 
retirement. 
Access to nonunion 
subsidiaries for transfer. 
Income protection 
enhanced. 
Priority placements for 
displaced workers. Income 
protection enhanced. 
No layoff agreement. 
Transfer and relocation 
assistance improved. 
No change 
Income protection 
enhanced. 
Joint committee on 
subcontracting. Improved 
early retirement income. 
Incentives for early 
retirement. 
No layoff agreement. 
Automated transfer system. 
Early-retirement 
severance increased. 
Hometown jobs— 
employment 
guarantees 
within market area. 
Job security for 
some occupations. 
Increase mobility 
rights. Extend 
bargaining unit. 
No layoff—broad 
transfer rights. Add 6 
years to service and 
seniority for pension 
eligibility. 
Improved workforce 
movement. Improved 
income protection 
and separation benefits 
No change 
Hometown jobs— 
employment guarantees 
within market area. 
Seniority strengthened. 
No layoffs, downgrades, 
or forced transfers; 3,000 
temps made permanent. 
Increase mobility rights. 
Extend bargaining unit. 
Commitment to 600 
techs; limits on temps 
and term employees. 
No layoffs, downgrades, 
or forced transfers; 3,000 
temps made permanent. 
Extension of the buyout 
deadline to 2000. 
Hire 500 outside techs. 
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TABLE 6—(Continued) 
CWA's Postdivestiture Employment Security Bargaining Outcomes 
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 
to 
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Southwest Bell-
SBC 
US West/Qwest 
Career resource center. 
Notice increased to 90 
days. Incentives for 
voluntary separation. 
No layoff agreement. 
Early-retirement income 
improved. 
Upgrade and transfer plan. 
Enhancements for 
voluntary separation. 
Voluntary severance Hometown jobs—find Hometown jobs—find 
expanded. jobs in market area. jobs in market area. 
Joint committee on skill Transfer to 
needs. Enhancements for mobile hiring 
voluntary separation. hall for techs. 
No change 
Source: CWA. 
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of 57,000) at a cost of over $2 billion, or $77,000 per participating 
employee. For the surviving workforce, NYNEX committed itself to no 
layoffs due to organizational or technological changes, internal transfer 
rights to all divisions, and first rights to jobs in new subsidiaries. It also 
funded an innovative two-year associate's degree program in telecom-
munications technology, open to all bargaining unit employees. 
Participating employees work four days a week and go to school the fifth 
day on company time, with all educational expenses paid by the com-
pany. Upon graduation, employees receive a fifty dollar a week increase. 
NYNEXs strategy recognizes that it is a high labor cost supplier, and it 
offsets this cost disadvantage with a highly educated, flexible, and pro-
ductive workforce. In the first two years of the program, roughly 1,100 
employees enrolled (Clifton 1999). In addition, employees with five 
years of service are eligible for a two-year educational leave, with educa-
tional expenses funded at $10,000 per year, while retaining full benefits, 
seniority, and a guaranteed job when they return. 
At Ameritech and Southwestern Bell in 1995, the CWA developed 
another innovative approach to employment security, known as "home-
town jobs." The companies agreed that all surplused employees would 
have a right to reassignment in their local labor market. This provision 
continued in the 1998 and 2001 contracts. This gain was critical for 
members because much of the restructuring in the decade involved 
consolidation of offices into new geographic locations. Many workers 
could not, or would not, "follow the work" because their spouses worked 
or because they did not want to uproot their children. 
Employment security receded as a key issue in the mid-1990s on, as 
demand for telecommunications services exploded. The former Bell 
affiliates miscalculated market demand. Most downsized too much and 
lost their most experienced workers, who often took their early-retire-
ment packages and went to work for Bell competitors. The Bell compa-
nies scrambled to hire replacements, poured money into new hire train-
ing, and experienced high levels of absenteeism and turnover unlike 
they had ever encountered. Short staffing led to forced overtime, which, 
as indicated previously, became a major strike issue in 1998. 
To handle their staffing problems and cut costs, the former Bell affili-
ates also have resorted to outsourcing and subcontracting of work, creat-
ing new tensions around employment security. The problem is particu-
larly salient for the call centers, where advances in call distribution 
systems allow companies to invisibly switch call loads to locations across 
ever larger geographic areas. At a unionized AT&T center in Dallas, for 
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example, the local union president began to notice a slow decline in call 
volumes in 1997. After three years, a fast decline began, and 200 service 
reps were fired in four months. By 2000, the workforce was down to 468, 
from 1,600. The experience was duplicated at five other centers across 
the country, with a resulting loss of 6,000 union jobs. AT&T had shifted 
the work to call centers run by subcontractors. At Verizon in New 
England in 2000, the CWA observed a similar pattern of centers losing 
call volume. However, subcontracting of work had been a strike issue in 
1998, and the subsequent agreement prohibited subcontracting of work 
outside the region. In this case, the union mobilized members to collect 
information from online accounts, such as sales codes or 800 numbers 
that were not from New England. The sales reps also started getting 
phone calls from centers in the South, asking them questions about the 
accounts. The union presented its evidence to the company, and call vol-
umes picked up shortly thereafter. The 2001 Verizon contract limits the 
company's ability to shift work from one region to another (from the for-
mer Bell Atlantic North to the South or to former GTE locations) to 0.7 
percent of all work. 
Overall, however, union workplaces continue to provide greater job 
security than nonunion ones, according to data from our 1998 national 
survey of telecommunications establishments. For example, in residen-
tial call centers, temporary workers averaged 1.2 percent of the work-
force in union centers but 6.5 percent in nonunion centers. Reported 
layoffs as a percentage of the current workforce were 6 percent in union 
establishments but 34 percent in nonunion centers. Among technicians, 
temporary workers were 2 percent of the union workforce and 7 per-
cent of the nonunion workforce. 
Union Institutional Security 
Managements intentions about its future relationship with the union 
are most readily conveyed by its willingness to negotiate union institu-
tional security provisions. Since these provisions make it easier for the 
union to organize and gain representation rights, they reveal whether 
management wants a constructive long-term relationship with the union 
or prefers to restrict or possibly eliminate the union s representative role. 
Union institutional security arrangements are permissive subjects of bar-
gaining, which cannot be brought to impasse, making them truly volun-
tary issues for management. Union institutional security agreements 
facilitate union organizing at large corporations, which have the capacity 
to choose their union status in today's legal environment (Kochan, 
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McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986). Basically these provisions recreate the 
framework for organizing that prevailed prior to Taft-Hartley (1947), 
when unions achieved their greatest organizing successes. 
Although each of the regional Bell companies and AT&T have cre-
ated nonunion subsidiaries since divestiture, they have each granted 
some of these provisions, except for Qwest/US West. The CWA made 
"wall-to-wall" representation a goal shortly after divestiture and has 
worked to educate members to fight for organizing rights in their con-
tracts. AT&T was the first to negotiate neutrality language in 1992, but 
the 1994 NYNEX agreement set the standard. Other companies have 
followed, with the unions pushing for stronger language in each succes-
sive contract, as exemplified in the case of SBC, discussed previously. 
Table 7 summarizes the union security provisions contained in collective 
bargaining agreements at the former Bell affiliates. The most prevalent 
provision is neutrality, where management agrees not to hire consultants 
or engage in a campaign to keep the union out of a nonunion workplace. 
Clearly, however, the ability of the union to win organizing campaigns 
based on neutrality and card check language depends on the character 
of union-management relations and the company's willingness to abide 
by the contract. As indicated previously, while the union has organized 
11,000 workers at SBC's Cingular Wireless, it has been unable to gain 
representation rights at Verizon's wireless entity. Organizing success in 
the nonunion subsidiaries will be closely linked to the success of strate-
gic partnership strategies. 
Bargaining for Service and Sales Representatives 
A very significant trend over the last decade has been the increasing 
salience of issues specific to the female-dominated service and sales 
workforce. In 1998, for the first time, the failure to resolve these issues 
contributed to strikes at Bell Atlantic, US West, and SNET. Historically, 
customer service employees were located in the business offices of tele-
phone companies where they handled orders and billing and were the 
least unionized or militant occupational group. Since deregulation, how-
ever, the former Bell affiliates have turned "order-taking" jobs into 
sales-maximizing positions, an affront to workers trained to care about 
providing excellent service to the public. Most local service bureaus 
have been consolidated into large remote call centers, making possible 
the application of industrial engineering models to automate and stan-
dardize customer transactions. Automated call distribution systems con-
trol the pace of work, and constant electronic monitoring exposes 
o 
TABLE 7 
Collectively Bargained Organizing Rights: Neutrality, Expedited Elections, Card Check, and Workplace Access for Organizers 
Company Neutrality 
Expedited NLRB 
consent elections 
Organizer 
Card check access Exceptions 
ft 
o 
w 
ft 
H 
2 
o 
w 
ft 
H 
O 
AT&T 
BellSouth 
Cingular Wireless 
(all SBC areas) 
Lucent 
Qwest (formerly US West) 
SBC (includes Ameritech, 
PacBell, SNET, SWB) 
Verizon 
Verizon Southwest 
Verizon Wireless 
Source: CWA. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0 
X 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 
0 
X 
X 
0 
X 
X 
? 
X 
0 
0 
X 
X 
? 
X 
Third party can order card check 
Except in BellSouth region 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
Successorship 
In former Bell Atlantic and NYNEX 
Card check in existing areas 
Area-Bell Atlantic Mobile 
Language in arbitration 
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employees to discipline based on a myriad of contradictory performance 
measures, including adherence to schedules, scripts, sales quotas, call-
handling time, and tone and manner with customers. All parties agree 
that these have become the most stressful jobs in the industry, with 
intense pressure to be polite to customers, while maximizing sales 
within a 300-second time limit per call. 
Ongoing contentious issues include commission pay, sales quotas, 
electronic monitoring, discipline for failure to meet performance stan-
dards, "adherence to schedules," and outsourcing and subcontracting. 
To respond to these issues, the union in 1990 began organizing annual 
"marketing conferences," which bring together 200 to 300 activists and 
local leaders from service and sales centers across the country. The con-
ferences focus on developing coordinated mobilization strategies, bar-
gaining agendas, and contract language regarding key workplace issues. 
For example, when the Bell companies began adopting tight restrictions 
on scheduling, including requirements that service reps "adhere" to 
their schedules (plugged into the computer and telephone lines) 90 per-
cent of the day, the reps jointly developed mobilization campaigns to 
combat the pressure. The national union also has commissioned quanti-
tative studies of health and safety, including ergonomics; carpel tunnel 
syndrome; and job-related stress, which members use in negotiations. 
All companies have sought to introduce individual sales incentives 
and commission pay, and the union has fiercely debated its response. 
There are three categories of incentives. "Trash and trinkets" are prizes, 
trips, or other awards for winning sales competitions for particular prod-
ucts or time-limited campaigns. Cash incentive plans provide periodic 
bonuses by the piece or for meeting sales objectives (for example, 50 to 
100 dollars per month over base pay). Commission pay plans put a por-
tion of base pay at risk. 
One approach is to "just say no," which the unions initially did. How-
ever, in some cases, companies have simply implemented a trash-and-
trinkets or incentive plan, and the union has filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge for failure to bargain or has arbitrated the case. However, 
this scenario is politically risky because many members like the extra 
money and prizes, and the union is portrayed as taking money away 
from members. Also, as an alternative to incentives, companies may sim-
ply institute sales quotas and discipline members, including termination, 
for failure to reach them. BellSouth, for example, has taken this ap-
proach, which has led to ongoing grievances and arbitrations. Beginning 
in the 1980s, the former Bell affiliates implemented trash-and-trinkets 
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programs, either with or without union approval. The unions at SBC, 
Southwestern Bell Telephone (SWBT), and SNET have not bargained 
over sales incentives but have been able to influence management 
strategies through joint committees on sales objectives and performance 
standards. 
A second approach is to negotiate over sales incentives but not com-
mission pay. In general, the union attitude has shifted from "just say no" 
to a recognition that sales incentives are a reality and the union should 
negotiate over them based on a set of principles. In 1998, the CWA and 
Pacific Telepone negotiated what has become a model agreement on 
principles for sales incentive plans. The agreement states that sales shall 
be "a win for all stakeholders," providing customers with good service, 
employees with pay opportunities and employment security, and the 
company with higher revenues. It requires training for all employees on 
product knowledge and sales techniques, strict adherence to ethical 
sales practices, no wages at risk, no sales quotas, sales goals based on 
sales opportunities, no performance evaluation based solely on sales, no 
discipline for failure to meet sales goals, and joint union-management 
oversight. Other union principles include negotiated adjustments for 
time not worked and clauses that allow workers who do not want to sell 
or who are not making objectives to transfer to a nonsales environment 
(Verizon contract). The union also states that incentive plans should not 
undermine the unions ability to represent members. This is especially 
an issue with commission pay plans where stewards may lose pay 
because they are not fully compensated for time spent on union duties. 
The CWA has negotiated commission pay at two companies: AT&T 
(1992) and US West (1995). The current AT&T plan, which covers sev-
eral hundred employees providing inbound and outbound sales to busi-
ness customers, provides for a guaranteed base of 80 percent of the full 
salary equivalent and a target of 20 percent for incentive pay. On aver-
age, the plan must pay out at least 90 percent of full salary equivalent. 
The plan is overseen by a joint union-management governance commit-
tee, and the union negotiated a series of protective measures, including 
a transition period for new hires, full pay for employees on leave, and an 
appeals process for commission calculation. Data from 1995 through 
1997 indicate that on average employees earned between 105 percent 
and 160 percent of full equivalent salary. In 1995, CWA District 7 at US 
West negotiated commission pay on a voluntary basis, and 58 percent of 
employees volunteered. All new employees, however, are hired under 
the plan. The plan, which is considerably more complex than that of 
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AT&T, includes five different levels of base wages and at-risk pay targets 
(trainees, who have no pay at risk, plus four levels of pay at risk: 10, 20, 
25, and 30 percent). Most employees have 20 percent at risk. Payouts 
are based on a complex formula for meeting individual and team targets 
for sales, service quality, and access (80 percent of calls answered within 
twenty seconds). Employees are paid the base wage for time off for 
training or union business, but savings plan, life insurance, and pension 
are calculated on the basis of average total monthly earnings. On aver-
age, sales consultants received about 23 percent higher wages in 1996, 
but the payouts were significantly lower in subsequent years. Even in 
1996, about 40 percent of the workers on commission received wages 
that were lower than the base wage, and this percentage grew in subse-
quent years. By the late 1990s, less than half of sales reps were meeting 
their monthly objectives. As a result, the union challenged the plan in 
arbitration, insisting that the objectives were not reasonable. Other neg-
ative outcomes include high turnover rates (of over 50 percent) and the 
union s difficulty in getting a sufficient number of experienced union 
stewards to represent members at the sites. 
While the companies have pushed for sales compensation plans, the 
unions have fought to reduce stress and onerous working conditions, im-
prove safety and health, limit mandatory overtime, provide for time "off-
line," and restrict electronic monitoring and performance-based discipline. 
Joint union-management committees designed to address stress, health 
and safety, or performance measures are functioning at Verizon, BellSouth, 
and the SBC companies of Southwestern Bell, Pacific Bell, Ameritech, 
and SNET. Forced overtime became a key issue in 1998 and 2001 bargain-
ing, and the unions gained contract language restricting (but not eliminat-
ing) its use at Verizon, SBC, Ameritech, BellSouth, and GTE-Southwest. 
In 2001, the CWA also won "closed time" provisions at these companies, 
guaranteeing employees thirty minutes of time offline each day for work-
related tasks, such as following up on customer orders or reading e-mail. 
Model contract language on electronic monitoring effectively bans 
secret call sampling, restricts the number of times per month that 
employee calls can be sampled, limits sampling of calls to employees 
who are not meeting performance objectives, and pushes companies to 
use monitoring primarily for developmental rather than disciplinary pur-
poses. The AT&T contract, for example, requires the company to give 
prior notice on the day the sampling occurs and to allow employees to 
choose whether they want remote or side-by-side monitoring. The con-
tract also prohibits discipline as a result of individual sampling except for 
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gross customer abuse, fraud, violation of privacy, or when development 
efforts have not been successful. Agreements with Qwest, BellSouth, and 
the SBC companies of Pacific Bell, Ameritech, SWBT, and SNET pro-
vide similar language. The Pacific Bell contract also limits monitoring to 
ten per month, no more than two days per month, and no more than one 
session per day, and requires feedback to employees within twenty-four 
hours (SNET and Verizon also have some of these limitations). The 
Ameritech agreement adds the clause that employees may request work 
time to review results. In 2001, Verizon-South agreed to a three-month 
trial moratorium on sampling of employees who meet performance 
requirements. The CWA has also negotiated language to limit unreason-
able discipline based on monitoring, for example, for commonsense devi-
ations from required scripts. 
The data from our 1998 national survey of establishments suggest that 
overall, the unions have been successful in limiting cost-cutting strategies 
in the call centers. Wages and working conditions are significantly better 
in union establishments along many dimensions. For example, in centers 
serving residential customers, union wages were 20 percent higher than 
in nonunion centers; and benefits as a percentage of median pay were 32 
percent in union centers but only 23 percent in nonunion centers. The 
average percentage of pay that is contingent (including profit sharing, 
gain sharing, and commission pay) was reported as 7.3 percent in union-
ized centers but 15.5 percent in nonunion centers. Moreover, union cen-
ters continue to invest more in the workforce, providing almost twice as 
much initial training (7.8 weeks versus 3.9 weeks) and ongoing training 
(2.8 weeks versus 1.9 weeks per year) compared to their nonunion coun-
terparts. As a result, annual quit rates in union centers are less than half 
those in nonunion centers (8.5 percent versus 17.7 percent). Finally, the 
percentage of the workforce with more than ten years' service was 50 per-
cent in the union centers but only 28 percent in nonunion establishments 
(see Batt, Colvin, Katz, and Keefe 2000). 
Conclusion 
Labor-management relations remain relatively stable in this indus-
try despite very considerable restructuring. The Bell companies still 
dominate every aspect of the industry, including wireline access, wire-
less, long distance, and data sectors. The recent consolidation trend in 
this industry may strengthen the process of collective bargaining. The 
CWA and IBEW are seeking to extend their influence into the growing 
sectors of the industry, particularly wireless, through neutrality and card 
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check agreements. During this period CWA has found and mobilized 
new power resources by lobbying, engaging in politics, developing 
media relations, and educating their members. Nonetheless, the growth 
in employment of managerial employees in their traditional strongholds 
of technical, sales, and service functions poses some unique challenges 
to the unions, given the constraints imposed by the NLRA. 
The future of labor-management relations and employment in tele-
communications remains uncertain. Further consolidation is likely as the 
industry recovers from the excesses of speculation and the Internet bub-
ble. The most stable companies are BellSouth, Verizon, and SBC, where 
union representation is embedded and stronger now than ten years ago. 
Notes 
1
 Research for this chapter was funded in part by a generous grant from the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
2
 The Bell System monopoly consisted of AT&T, Western Electric, Bell Labs, and 
twenty-two local telephone companies. A court-ordered divestiture split the system 
into its component parts and reconfigured the local telephone companies into seven 
regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs). 
3
 Communications Workers of America, or CWA, founded in 1947, is a direct 
descendant of the company unions established by AT&T in 1918 that were trans-
formed by the NLRA. The CWA is Americas largest communications union; it repre-
sents more than 740,000 men and women in both private and public sectors, includ-
ing some 300,000 workers in telecommunications. The union includes some 1,200 
chartered local unions across the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. CWA 
holds more than 2,000 collective bargaining agreements, which are under the control 
of the national union. The CWA views SBC (Southwest Bell, Ameritech, Pacific Bell, 
Southern New England Telephone, and Cingular) and Verizon as its two most impor-
tant and strategic relationships in the industry. CWA members are employed in 
telecommunications, broadcasting, cable TV, journalism, publishing, electronics, and 
general manufacturing, as well as airline customer service, government service, 
health care, education, and other fields. 
4
 The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, or IBEW, was founded in 
1891 as an AF of L craft union to represent the emerging trade of electrical workers. 
IBEW represents more than 40,000 employees in the telecommunications industry, 
with more than 400 industrial-type collective bargaining agreements. For the most 
part, IBEW locals bargain their own contracts, but they may also come together to 
form a System s Council for the purpose of collective bargaining. In comparison with 
the CWA, IBEW locals retain much greater local autonomy than CWA locals. The 
IBEW also runs telecommunications apprenticeship programs through its 354 train-
ing centers in North America. These employees work under building trades agree-
ments. Overall, the IBEW has approximately 750,000 members in the construction 
trades, electric utility industry, manufacturing, railroads, telecommunications, and 
government. 
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5
 For prior analyses of industry restructuring and union-management relations, 
see Keefe and Boroff (1994), Keefe and Batt (1997), and Batt and Keefe (1999). 
Keefe and Boroff (1994) analyze industry trends and restructuring in the 1980s and 
postdivestiture collective bargaining agreements (1986, 1989, 1992), demonstrating 
the continued existence of industrywide pattern bargaining led by AT&T. Keefe and 
Batt (1997) explore the competing influences and strategies of centralization and 
decentralization in the industry, between 1984 and 1996. For that period, they ana-
lyze changes in product markets, technology, and business strategy. They particularly 
focus on competing management strategies for the reorganization of work and inter-
nal labor markets in the core occupational groups: network technicians, customer 
service and sales workers, operators, and the managers of these groups. Batt and 
Keefe (1999) analyze the extent of variation in employment practices within firms 
(particularly within the former Bell companies) and across firms (with a review of 
trends in the union/nonunion wage gap). They analyze shifts in the occupational dis-
tribution of employment, from 1982 to 1995, by race and sex. They also update the 
analysis of postdivestiture markets, technologies, and business strategies through 
1995 and update Keefe and Boroff's (1994) analysis of collective bargaining out-
comes through 1995. 
6
 Under the new North American Industrial Classification System (NAIC), SIC 
481 is NAIC 5132 and SIC 484 is NAIC 5133. 
' The sample is a stratified random sample drawn from the Dun and Bradstreet 
listing of establishments. Establishments were stratified by size (10 to 99 employees, 
100-plus employees) and by SIC code (4812, cellular; 4813, wireline; 4841, cable), 
with establishments that have more than 100 employees oversampled to capture a 
larger percentage of the workforce. The sample was also stratified by state location, 
and all states are represented. Because Internet service providers (ISPs) are an 
important new part of the industry, but not systematically captured by SIC code, 
additional ISPs were identified through the Directory of National Dial-Up Providers 
and Area Codes of Operation. A university-based survey team administered the tele-
phone survey in fall 1998. The telephone interview averaged fifty-two minutes and 
yielded a 54 percent response rate. To check for response bias, we estimated a logit 
model, with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the establishment participated in 
the survey. There were no statistically significant effects for whether the establish-
ment was a branch or a single location, whether it was publicly or privately held, or 
whether a Bell company owned it. ISPs were somewhat less likely to respond so that 
they may be slightly underrepresented in this sample. 
8
 Relations between CWA and IBEW in the region were strained. Prior to the 
1989 Bell Atlantic talks, for example, CWA and IBEW leaders committed to keeping 
their respective members on strike until the company withdrew its demand for man-
aged care. The IBEW leadership was angered when CWA leaders abruptly accepted 
managements proposal for managed care and returned to work after a three-week 
strike. In 1995, with the contract for both unions scheduled to expire in August, Bell 
Atlantic first bargained a new five-year contract with IBEW Local 827, which repre-
sents some 8,000 network employees in New Jersey. The IBEW obtained upgrades 
for all incumbent installation and repair technicians to top craft titles. However, in 
exchange for five years of job security, the union agreed to a two-tier wage agree-
ment and the creation of a new unionized subsidiary, Bell Atlantic Communications 
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and Construction Systems Inc. (BACCSI). The new company would be allowed to 
perform traditional telephone installation and repair, but the new workforce would 
have fewer rights and benefits and top out at 50 percent of the pay of incumbent 
workers. The BACCSI agreement set wages and benefits at or below nonunion levels 
in the cable TV industry. In addition, the new contract required a 2 percent copay for 
retiree health insurance and provided only a 10 percent pension improvement and 8 
percent in wage increases over the first three years of the agreement. 
9
 Data for this analysis come from the merged annual earnings file of the CPS for 
the telecommunications services industry (SIC code 481) between 1983 and 1998 
(prior years do not include union status). The data are from the monthly outgoing 
rotation group. The method used follows Katz and Murphy (1992). Our sample in-
cludes persons over sixteen years of age who were employed for at least thirty-five 
hours per week and who reported earnings above the minimum wage. The sample, 
therefore, excludes part-time workers, thereby providing a relatively conservative 
estimate of wage inequality. We identify two occupational groups: clerical/sales and 
technical. Clerical includes computer operators, secretaries, typists, telephone opera-
tors, and order clerks. We combine clerical and sales groups for purposes of analysis 
because the content of work in these two categories overlaps. "Customer service rep-
resentatives," for example, often primarily do sales. Technical workers include com-
puter programmers, electrical and electronic technicians, telephone installers and 
repairmen, linemen and splicers, electronic repairers, and other technicians. Wages 
are adjusted according to the CPI-U, where 1983 equals 99.6. 
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